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Abstract We study controlled quantum secure direct communication (CQSDC),
a cryptographic scheme where a sender can send a secret bit-string to an in-
tended recipient, without any secure classical channel, who can obtain the
complete bit-string only with the permission of a controller. We report an
efficient protocol to realize CQSDC using Cluster state and then go on to
construct a (2-3)-CQSDC using Brown state, where a coalition of any two of
the three controllers is required to retrieve the complete message. We argue
both protocols to be unconditionally secure and analyze the efficiency of the
protocols to show it to outperform the existing schemes while maintaining the
same security specifications.
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1 Introduction
Establishing secure communication between two (or more) parties, without
any undesirable leakage of information, is the ultimate goal of cryptography.
While a conventional way of achieving this is to have a key (pair) shared
among the participating parties, with at least one of the key (pair) to be
private. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols [1] tend to facilitate
such pursuits, in practice. Another way to accomplish this task is through
Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC). The first QSDC protocol,
where the message is encoded in the EPR quantum states was given by Long
et al., [2]. Seminal works by Beige et al., [3] and further developed by Bostro¨m
et al., [4] and Deng et al., [5], among others, that permits the secret messages
to be transmitted directly among the desired parties without any pre-shared
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key. Such protocols have been well studied in the recent years, and effective
protocols have been proposed utilizing single photon resources [6] , Bell states
[7] [8] [9], GHZ states [10] [11], GHZ-like states [12] and W states [13] [14] [15].
The idea of ’controlled communication’, where a controller’s permission is
required to completely facilitate a communication, was introduced by Zutowski
et al., [16]. Recents works due to [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] have motivated the
study of Controlled Quantum Secure Direct Communication (CQSDC) proto-
cols, where a message can be sent by a sender to the intended recipient, who
can only recover the message, with the permission/cooperation of a controller.
CQSDCs can be perceived a more general form of QSDC. Any CQSDC scheme
can be reduced and made operationally equivalent to a(n) (Interactive) QSDC
scheme by simply allowing the sender to assume the role of the controller in
addition. In this paper, we report a simple construction of a CQSDC scheme
using Cluster state, that is feasible to implement using the current technolo-
gies. It is demonstrably shown to be more efficient than the existing protocols
[18] [20] [21] while mainlining the same security specifications. Also unlike the
existing schemes, the proposed one also does not need entanglement swapping.
We further give a construction of a (2-3)-CQSDC using Brown state, where at
least two of the three controllers must form a coalition to recover the message.
This is the first proposal for a thresholding based CQSDC to the best of the
authors’ knowledge.
2 CQSDC with Cluster state
The task of carrying out Controlled Quantum Secure Direct Communication
is divided into two steps -Preparation Step and Retrieval Step. In the Prepa-
ration Step the sender, Alice, encodes the message using suitable local unitary
transformations on her subsystem, followed by measuring her subsystems. The
Retrieval Step is where the receiver, Bob, requests permission of the controller,
Charlie, to recover the message. Ideally, without Charlie’s permission, Bob
must not be able to fully recover the message.
A 4-qubit Cluster state is defined as
|C〉
4
=
(
|0000〉+ |1001〉+ |0110〉 − |1111〉
)
a1,a2,b1,c1
2
(1)
To send two bit messages, a four-qubit Cluster state, |C4〉, is used, such
that two qubits are possessed by Alice, and one qubit by Bob and one qubit
by Charlie, i.e., |C〉a1,a2,b1,c1 is distributed as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Distribution of Qubits, of the Cluster state (1), among the parties
Party Qubits
Alice a1, a2
Bob b1
Charlie c1
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In the Preparation Step, the secret message is encoded as shown in Ta-
ble 2. Here X represents an operation of a X-Gate (Bit flip) on the qubit
corresponding to the specified column, and I represents an operation of a
I-Gate (Identity) on the qubit. More concretely, X = (|0〉 〈1| + |1〉 〈0|) and
I = (|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1|)
Table 2: Operations Alice applies on her qubits.
Secret Message a1 a2
00 I I
01 X X
10 X I
11 I X
Following that, Alice, Bob and Charlie measure their systems and Alice
sends her measurement outcomes (two c-bits) to Bob. During the Retrieval
Step, Bob requests Charlie to send his measurement outcome to Bob. Based
on the information available to Bob (i.e., Alice’s measurement outcomes that
Alice had sent in the Preparation Step, Bob’s measurement outcomes, and
the measurement outcomes received from Charlie), Bob consults the following
table to recover the secret message.
Table 3: Corresponding messages for possible measurement outcomes
Alice’s Bob’s Charlie’s Secret
Measurement Measurement Measurement Message
00 0 0
00
01 1 0
10 0 1
11 1 1
00 1 1
01
01 0 1
10 1 0
11 0 0
00 0 1
10
01 1 1
10 0 0
11 1 0
00 1 0
11
01 0 0
10 1 1
11 0 1
To exemplify, suppose Alice wants to send a message 01 to Bob, then
following the distribution of qubits as in Table 1, Alice applies an X ◦X to her
system (as in Table 2) and measures it and reports the measurement outcome,
say b1, b2, using an authenticated channel, to Bob. Bob now requests Charlie
for his permission. Charlie measures his system forwards his measurement
outcome, say b4 to Bob. Bob also measures his system to see b3. Bob now
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looks up Table 3 to identify the column for the tuple (b1, b2, b3, b4) and be able
to recover the message 01.
2.1 Security Analysis
The security analysis of the protocol includes the analysis of the scheme with-
out the permission of the controller and the condition, where all the classical
information is displayed to Eve.
2.1.1 Analysis of the scheme without the permission of Charlie
Notice the distribution of classical bits due to measurement outcomes over
the space messages (as in Table 3) is uniform in the length of message. Thus,
in this case, Bob must need all 4 bits of classical information to identify the
intended message sent to him. Without the permission of Charlie, he only
has access to atmost 3 bits of information. If Bob has a better strategy than
to guess Charlie’s bit, with a guessing probability > 1/2, then this violated
Information Causality [23], which says the maximum information that Bob
can gain about previously unknown knowledge, using all local resources and n
classical bits, is at most n. However, with access to just Alice’s measurement
outcomes, and his own measurement outcome, Bob does learn about learn 1
bit of information. It can be seen, this 1 − bit information that Bob learns is
the 2nd bit of the message.
Thus, the probability that Bob can correctly guess the information Alice
has sent without the permission of Charlie is given by,
Pr(mn = 00|xyz) = Pr(mn = 01|xyz) = Pr(mn = 10|xyz) = Pr(mn = 11|xyz) = 1/2
where mn, xy and z indicate the secret message, Alice’s reading and Bob’s
reading respectively.
2.1.2 Analysis of the scheme when all the classical information is displayed
The same argument as in Section 2.1.1. can be used to convince the inability of
an Evesdropper, Eve, who has access to all classical communication from Alice
and Charlie, to predict the classical message. Due to the uniformity in the view
of Bob and Charlie, the roles of the Eve and Bob in here can be perceived as
Bob and Charlie in 2.1.1. The 1 bit of information that Eve learns here is the
parity of the message.
Thus, the probability that Eve can correctly guess the information when
she has access to all the classical bits sent is given by,
Pr(mn = 00|xyz) = Pr(mn = 01|xyz) = Pr(mn = 10|xyz) = Pr(mn = 11|xyz) = 1/2
where mn, xy and z indicate the secret message, Alice’s reading and Charlie’s
reading respectively.
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2.2 Efficiency
The efficiency of the protocols can be measured using the following equations,
as previously used in [18], [19], [21].
η1 =
mu
qk + bk
(2)
η2 =
mu
qk
(3)
where mu, qk and ck denote the number of bits in the secret message,
number of qubits used and the number of bits of classical communication used.
Ideally, higher the value of η1 and η2, the more efficient the scheme would be.
The values of the η1 and η2 for the proposed protocol along with the other
protocols are given in the Table 4.
Table 4: Comparison of efficiency of various protocols
Protocol η1 η2
Dong et al. [18] 0.125 0.25
Kao et al. [19] 0.125 0.25
Hassanpour et al. [21] 0.22 0.33
Proposed Protocol 0.28 0.50
It may be noted, unlike the other protocols, the proposed protocol doesn’t
make use of Entanglement Swapping or other complex operations, however, as
demonstrated, attains better efficiency than the existing ones. Also compared
to other protocols, the proposed protocol is simpler to implement and is inex-
pensive in terms of the number of gates and measurements required to realize
this.
3 (2-3)-CQSDC with Brown state
A (2-3)-CQSDC is a thresholding based Controlled Quantum Secure Direct
Communication, where a sender sends a two-bit message, that can be com-
pletely recovered only when any two of three controllers form a coalition. To
realize the protocol, a 5-qubit Brown state is used here.
|B〉
5
=
(
|001〉 |Φ−〉+ |010〉 |Ψ−〉+ |100〉 |Φ+〉 − |111〉 |Ψ+〉
)
a,b,c,d,e
2
(4)
where |Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) and |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). Brown state
[24] have shown their utility to carry out diverse quantum tasks, including
teleportation, quantum state sharing, superdense coding have been studied
rather exhaustively [25]. Here, to perform a (2-3) CQSDC, a 5-qubit Brown
state, |B〉a,b,c,d,e is distributed among the concerned parties - the sender, Alice,
and the controllers, Charlie1, Charlie2, Charlie3, as in Table 5.
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Table 5: Distribution of Qubits of the Brown state (4) among the parties
Party Qubits
Alice d, e
Charlie1 a
Charlie2 b
Charlie3 c
In the Preparation Step, to encode a two bit message, Alice applies the
suitable unitaries on her subsystem as described in the Table 6, where X
represents an operation of a X-Gate (Bit flip) on the qubit, I represents an
operation of a I-Gate (Identity) on the qubit and Z represents an operation
of a Z-Gate(phase flip) on the qubit. More concretely, I = (|0〉 〈0| + |1〉 〈1|),
X = (|0〉 〈1|+ |1〉 〈0|), Z = (|0〉 〈0| − |1〉 〈1|)
Table 6: Operations Alice applies on her qubits.
Secret Message a1 a1
00 I I
01 Z X
10 Z I
11 I X
Following that, Alice, and the controllers, Charlie1, Charlie2, and Charlie3
measure their qubits, and Alice sends her measurement outcomes to all the
controllers.
In the Retrieval Step, at least two of the three controllers, must come
together and collaborate to get the secret message. Based on the distribution
as in Table 7, it may be noted, given Alice’s Measurements are known to all,
the coalition of two controllers is necessary and sufficient to recover the secret
message.
It may be noted that it is possible for any of the controllers to presume
the role of Bob during the protocol. It is also possible for at-most two of
the three controllers to recover the message, privately with the permission of
another controller. Suppose Alice wants to send a message 10. Following the
distribution of qubits as in Table 5, Alice applies the operation Z ⊗ X to
her subsystem (as in Table 6) and measures it to see an outcome, sayb1, b2
and sends her outcomes to the intended recipient (say Charliei). Charliei now
measures his system, to see b3 and with the permission of Charliej, (i 6= j),
who, on consent, measures his own system to see and correctly reports b4, now
has a tuple (b1, b2, b3, b4) can recover the intended message Alice had send, by
looking up Table 7.
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Table 7: Corresponding messages for possible measurement outcomes
Alice’s Charlie1’s Charlie2’s Charlie3’s Secret
Measurement Measurement Measurement Measurement Message
φ− 0 0 1
00
ψ− 0 1 0
φ+ 1 0 0
ψ+ 1 1 1
ψ− 0 0 1
01
φ− 0 1 0
ψ+ 1 0 0
φ+ 1 1 1
φ+ 0 0 1
10
ψ+ 0 1 0
φ− 1 0 0
ψ− 1 1 1
ψ+ 0 0 1
11
φ+ 0 1 0
ψ− 1 0 0
φ− 1 1 1
3.1 Security Analysis
3.1.1 Analysis of the scheme without the permission of a second controller
Notice the distribution of classical bits due to measurement outcomes of Alice
and any two Charliei and Charliej, over space space of messages is uniform,
as in Table 7. Hence to for a Charliek, recover the message, he needs 4 bits
of information. Without the permission of a second controller, Charliek has
access to only 3 bits of information. If Bob could design a better strategy
than randomly guessing the second controller’s measurement outcome with
probability greater than 1
2
, then he violates Information Causality [23], in the
same spirit as argued in Section 2.1.1. Hence, The probability that only one
of the three can correctly guess the information Alice has sent without the
permission of a second controller is given by,
Pr(mn = 00|xyz) = Pr(mn = 01|xyz) = Pr(mn = 10|xyz) = Pr(mn = 11|xyz) = 1/2
where mn is the secret message, xy is Alice’s measurement outcome and z is
the measurement outcome of Charliek.
3.1.2 Analysis of the scheme when all the classical information is displayed
An eavesdropper, Eve, who sees the classical communication between Alice
and one of the Charlie’s, say Charliei, has access to 3 bits of information.
Of-course, if both two of the controller’s, Charliej, Charlierk in the protocol
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want to help Charliei, Eve learns 4 bits of information, and can figure out the
intended message. However this can be avoided, by letting only one controller
to control the permission. In a case where both controllers want to help, only
one must send out the classical bits. Now, given 3 bits of information to Eve,
one can build up the same argument as in Section 3.1.1, with Eve and Charliei
(here) playing the role of Charliei and Charliejork (as in 3.1.1), to claim,
given 3-bits of information an eavesdropper can figure out the message, then
it violates Information Causality [23].
Hence, The probability that Eve can correctly guess the information when
she has access to all the classical bits sent is given by,
Pr(mn = 00|xyz) = Pr(mn = 01|xyz) = Pr(mn = 10|xyz) = Pr(mn = 11|xyz) = 1/2
where mn, xy and z indicate the secret message, Alice’s reading and Charlie’s
reading respectively.
3.2 Efficiency
The values of η1 and η2 for the proposed protocol, computed based on Eq. 2
and Eq. 3 are 0.25 and 0.40.
The exquisite nature of the five qubit Brown state, where two of the parti-
cles are entangled as Bell States makes it possible to use Brown state in such
a conditionally controlled communication scheme.
4 Conclusion
We have presented here two efficient protocols for Controlled Quantum Secure
Direct Communication. The first one is an unidirectional CQSDC scheme,
involving a sender, controller and a receiver, that makes use of Cluster state,
where the sender sends two bit messages to the receiver who recovers the
message with the help of a controller. We analyze the security and efficiency
of the proposed scheme and report it to be more efficient than the existing
protocols while maintaining the same security specifications. Following that,
we introduce a thresholding based (2-3)-CQSDC scheme using Brown state,
involving a sender and three controllers, where only two controllers need to
collude to recover a two bit message sent by a sender.
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